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RETAILER AND MANUFACTURER LIABILITY
IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES
FOR PERSONAL INJURY FROM
DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS
HYPOTHETICAL CASE
Consumer A selected and bought at a retail store operated by
Retailer B a wooden stepladder manufactured by Manufacturer
C. When A, a man of i8o pounds, later mounted the ladder
to hang a picture on the wall in his house, the ladder collapsed
because of a defect in the wood which was not observable by mere
visual inspection. A suffered grave bodily injuries amounting to
$iooo in medical costs alone. Disregarding other elements of
damages, can A recover $iooo from either B or C?
LIABILITY UNDER GERMAN LAW*
CONSUMER V. RETAILER
.) (a) Consumer A and Retailer B concluded a contract for the
sale of a stepladder. The buyer's relief will, therefore, primarily sound
in contract. If the thing sold is defective, the seller is liable as against
the buyer for breach of warranty regardless of fault on his part. Sections
459, 462, and 463 of the German Civil Code' afford the buyer three
alternative remedies: (I) rescission of the contract; (2) diminution of
the price; and (3) damages for breach of contract. None of these
* Hans Peter Haas, fourth semester student, University of Kiel, Kiel, Germany,
prepared the portion of this article dealing with liability under German law.
1 GERMAN CIVIL CODE § 459 (Chung Hui Wang transl. 1907) [hereinafter
G.C.C.]-"The seller of a thing warrants the purchaser that, at the time when the risk
passes to the purchaser, it is free from defects which diminish or destroy its value or
fitness for its ordinary use or the use presupposed in the contract. An insignificant
diminution in value or fitness is not taken into consideration.
"The seller also warrants that, at the time the risk passes, the thing has the promised
qualities."
G.C.C. § 46z-"On account of a defect for which the seller is responsible under
the provisions of 459, 46o, the purchaser may demand annulment of the sale (i.e.,
cancellation), or reduction of the purchase price (i.e., reduction)."
G.C.C. § 463-"If a promised quality in the thing sold was absent at the time of
the purchase, the purchaser may demand compensation for non-performance, instead of
cancellation or reduction. The same rule applies if the seller has fraudulently concealed
a defect.
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remedies, however, gives the buyer more than compensation for the
direct and immediate consequences of the non-performance of the con-
tract; none of them provides for recovery of damages suffered indirectly
due to the defects of the thing sold.2 A's remedies for breach of war-
ranty against B would, therefore, entitle him to rescind the contract of
sale and recover his purchase price, or to demand delivery of a new
stepladder, or to keep the ladder and recover part of his purchase price.
He would not be able to recover damages for his personal injuries,
however.
(b) If the seller was negligent in selling the defective ladder, the
consumer might have a further contractual claim against the retailer.
Basically the German Civil Code has regulated the liability for non-
performance of contracts under two headings only: impossibility and
non-delivery. Both Sections 280, 286, which apply to unilateral obliga-
tions, and Sections 325, 326,4 applying to mutual obligations, afford
2See the decision of the German Supreme Court of November x3, 1940, [ 94 ]
Deutsches Recht 637, 638.
" G.C.C. § 28o-"Where the performance becomes impossible in consequence of a
circumstance for which the debtor is responsible, the debtor shall compensate the
creditor for any damage arising from the non-performance.
"In case of partial impossibility the creditor may, by declining the still possible part
of the performance, demand compensation for non-performance of the entire obligation,
if he has no interest in the partial performance... 2
G.C.C. § z86-"The debtor shall compensate the creditor for any damage arising
from his default.
"If the creditor has no interest in the performance in consequence of the default,
he may, by refusing the performance, demand compensation for non-performance...."
' G.C.C. § 3 z2-"If the performance due from one party under a mutual contract
becomes impossible in consequence of a circumstance for which he is responsible, the
other party may demand compensation for non-performance, or rescind the contract.
In case of partial impossibility, if he has no interest in the partial performance of the
contract, he is entitled, subject to the conditions specified in 280, par. 2, to demand
compensation for non-performance of the entire obligation, or to rescind the entire
contract....
"The same rule applies in the case provided for by z83, if the performance is not
effected before the expiration of the period, or if at that time it is in part not
effected."
G.C.C. § 3 26-"If, in the case of a mutual contract, one party is in default in
respect of the performance due from him, the other party may allot him a fixed
reasonable period for performing his part with a declaration that he will decline the
performance after the expiration of the period. After the expiration of the period he
is entitled to demand compensation for non-performance, or to rescind the contract,
if the performance has not been effected in due time; the claim for performance is
barred. If the performance is in part not effected before the expiration of the period,
the provision of 325, par. 1, sentence 2, applies mnutatis -nutandis.
"If, in consequence of the default, the performance of the contract is of no use to
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the party injured an action for damages in such cases. Relief here,
however, is predicated upon some fault on the part of the non-perform-
ing party. The fault can be either intentional or negligent, a negligent
person being defined by Section 276" as one "who does not exercise
ordinary care." Under this theory, the damages recoverable cover not
only losses incurred out of the transaction itself, but those arising
indirectly.
The phrases "impossibility" and "non-delivery" fail to cover the
innumerable fact situations in which the violation of contractual obliga-
tions through the fault of one party causes damage to the other party.
In order to afford an equitable solution of the cases not specifically pro-
vided for in the Code, constant usage as evidenced by judicial decisions
has created the so-called positive violation of contract (culpa in con-
trahendo) theory as a new ground for recovery of damages sounding in
contract.' This doctrine, which applies wherever one party to a
contract culpably has violated its contractual obligations other than by
non-delivery or self-incurred impossibility of performance, is based on
the general principle of liability for fault underlying German contract
law and evidenced, for instance, by such provisions as Sections 28o, 286,
325, and 326 of the Civil Code.7
The retailer's liability on this ground would be contingent upon
his fault. Since B was unaware of the defect in the ladder, this fault
cannot be intentional. Was B, then, negligent? As defined by Section
2768 of the Civil Code, the standard of due care has to be determined
from case to case in accordance with general custom as regards the type
of transaction at hand. In the present case, the seller cannot reasonably
be expected to subject all the ladders offered for sale by him to a
thorough investigation for concealed flaws. Therefore, he did not act
negligently. Consequently, as there was no fault on the part of the re-
the other party, such other party has the rights specified in par. i without the fixing of
a period being necessary."
'G.C.C. § 27 6--"A debtor is responsible, unless it is otherwise provided, for wilful
default and negligence. A person who does not exercise ordinary care acts negligent-
. • ..
"A debtor may not be released beforehand from responsibility for wilful default."
8 See the following decisions of the German Supreme Court: 54 Entscheidungen des
Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen [hereinafter R.G.Z.] 98i 100-103 (1903) io6 R.G.Z.
22, 24-26 (1922); 149 R.G.Z. 4o, 403-404 (1935); xx Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [hereinafter B.G.H.Z.] 80, 83-84 (1953).
" See supra notes 3 and 4. And see the judgment of the German Supreme Court of
November 13, 1953, 1x B.G.H.Z. So, 83.
" See supra note 5.
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tailer, the consumer cannot recover damages from him on the basis of
positive violation of contractual obligations.
2) While Consumer A is thus unable to recover damages sounding
in contract for his bodily injuries, he might seek to recover damages
sounding in tort. Section 823' of the Civil Code provides that one who
intentionally or negligently and unlawfully injures the body or the
health of another is liable to the person injured for the harm caused
thereby. Since the general standard of due care, as defined by Section
276, applies to the whole law of obligations the retailer would only be
liable under this section if he disregarded the degree of diligence
customary in such cases. As has been discussed above, this is not the case.
Therefore, Consumer A does not have a delictual claim against Re-
tailer B.
CONSUMER V. MANUFACTURER
The question now arises whether the consumer can claim damages
from the manufacturer of the ladder. German law generally predicates
liability for non-performance of a contract-barring contracts for the
benefit of third parties-upon the existence of a direct contractual rela-
tionship between the person responsible and the person injured." How-
ever, if one party to a contract employs an agent in the fulfillment of his
contractual obligations, he becomes liable for the fault of such agent."
When the damages inflicted by such agents are incurred by third
parties with respect to whom the principal is under no contractual obliga-
tion, the latter's liability for the fault of his agents is regulated by
Section 831 12 in accordance with which the principal is liable only if
he has acted negligently in the selection and employment of such agents.
'G.C.C. § 82 3-"A person who, wilfully or negligently, unlawfully injures the
life, body, health, freedom, property or any other right of another is bound to compen-
sate him for any damage arising therefrom.
"A person who infringes a statutory provision intended for the protection of
others incurs the same obligation. If, according to the purview of the statute, infringe-
ment is possible even without any fault on the part of the wrong-doer, the duty to make
compensation arises only if some fault can be imputed to him."
'0 See the decision of the German Supreme Court of May 9, 1939, 16o R.G.Z. 310,
314-315-
' G.C.C. § 278 provides: "A debtor is responsible for the fault of his statutory
agent, and of persons whom he employs in fulfilling his obligation, to same extent as
for his own fault. The provision of 276, par. z, does not apply."
"G.C.C. § 831-"A person who employs another to do any work is bound to
compensate for any damage which the other unlawfully causes to a third party in the
performance of his work. The duty to compensate does not arise if the employer has
exercised ordinary care in the selection of the employee, and, where he has to supply
appliances or implements or .to superintend the work, has also exercised ordinary care
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x) While we may assume that the agent of Manufacturer C who
was responsible for the construction of the ladder has acted negligently,
Consumer A will most probably not be able to recover against C on the
basis of Section 83 ,1 since C undoubtedly will be able to show that he
acted with due care and diligence in selecting his agent.
2) The absolute liability for the fault of agents, as stipulated by
Section 278's does not apply as against A, since there is no, contractual
connection between A and C. Consequently, A will not be able to
recover as against C under this Code provision.
3) There seem to be substantial grounds for criticism of such an
outcome, based as it is on the strict letter of the law. The absence of a
contractual nexus between producer and seller combines with the possi-
bility of exculpation for acts of agents not engaged in the fulfillment of
contractual obligations' 5 to enable the manufacturer to escape liability.
Some legal authors have shown an increasing tendency to assume a
quasi-contractual tie between manufacturer and consumer which would
exclude the possibility of exculpation, a result they consider socially
unjustifiable. These authorities generally start with the assumption that
the manufacturer owes a general quasi-contractual obligation to the public
at large to furnish goods without "dangerous" defects, and postulate
that the breach of such quasi-contractual obligation gives rise to a cause
of action of the injured consumer against the manufacturer.1
Professor Such, for instance, submits that cases like the present,
expressly mentioned by him, should be dealt with by assuming an action-
able duty of the manufacturer in favor of the consumer to furnish goods
without defects. Since modern industrial producers, in planning their
manufacturing activities, generally also strive to predetermine the out-
lets and the means of distribution of their end products (e.g., vertical
price maintenance), there is, he urges, in reality a direct "chain of sale"
between producer and consumer. He proposes to classify this chain of
sale as a quasi-contractual nexus excluding the applicability of the ex-
culpatory provision of Section 83 1.1
as regards such supply or superintendence, or if the damage would have arisen, not-
withstanding the exercise of such care.
"The same responsibility attaches to a person who, by contract with the employer,
undertakes to take charge of any of the affairs specified in par. x, sentence a2."
See supra note 12. a See suPra note i .
'
5 See G.C.C. § 831, supra note 12.
a This line of thinking has been expressed with great lucidity by Heinz Such,
WIRTSCHAFTSPLANUNG UND SACHMANGELHAFTUNG I O3ff (1948).
"See supra note 12.
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While Such's argument appears to be both cogent and impressive,
it can hardly be overlooked that the virtual elimination of Section 831
proposed by him would run counter to the letter and spirit of the law
currently in force. It may be that the future will bring a factual amend-
ment of the Civil Code by judicial legislation along the course outlined
by him or that Parliament will enact the occasionally-discussed amend-
ment of Section 831. Until then, however, it is relatively safe to as-
sume that he has merely made an eloquent plea for a change of the law,
and not a statement of the lex lata.
CONSUMER V. MANUFACTURER VIA RETAILER
As between retailer and manufacturer, there originally must have
been a contract for the sale of the ladder in question. Manufacturer C
presumably employed one or more agents in the fulfillment of this
contractual obligation, e.g., the fabrication of the ladder. As regards
Retailer B, C is liable for all fault of his agents in the construction of the
ladder, as due to the contractual relationship existing betwen B and C.
C's liability here is predicated upon Section 27818 and not 831." While
the factual question whether an agent of C actually did act negligently
in the construction of the ladder would yet have to be determined, it
will be assumed for the purpose of this note that one of C's agents was,
in fact, negligent.
Retailer B, therefore, would be entitled to compensation from Manu-
facturer C for the damages suffered by him through the negligence of
C's agent. However, in this case, it was the consumer, not the seller,
who suffered such damage. This is a fact situation falling within the
so-called "shifting of damages" theory. The common characteristic
of such cases is that the damage normally suffered by the person legally
entitled to compensation is suffered by a third party who, on principle,
is not so entitled. It would be most unjust if in such cases the person
responsible-here the manufacturer-were to escape all liability, and if
the person injured were to obtain no reparation. For this reason, legal
authors, and, in principle, some courts have held that as an exception
from the general rule that every person can recover damages only for
such injuries as he himself has suffered, the uninjured party to the
contract is entitled in such cases to demand from the negligent party
18 See supra note i i.
'o See supra note xz.
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indemnity for the injuries suffered by a third person who is not a party
to the contract.20
This so-called liquidation of damages for the benefit of third parties
can be effectuated either by Consumer A directly, in which case he will
have to obtain an assignment of Retailer B's claim against Manufacturer
C prior to instituting action against the latter, or by B on behalf of A, in
which case B will be liable to turn over the compensation recovered to A.
Section 28i21 of the Civil Code affords A the possibility of compelling
B to execute such an assignment if he does not choose to institute the
action himself. Thus, A acquires either a direct, or through B, an in-
direct claim for damages as against C for positive violation of contract
obligations. Compensation for damages is generally regulated by Sec-
tion 249, following, of the Civil Code. In accordance with Section
249,22 the person injured can demand reparation in the form of pecuniary
damages instead of specific relief. Since liability for violation of con-
tract obligations covers, as indicated above, all damage suffered by the
other party, C will have to compensate A fully for his bodily injuries.
"See generally LARENZ, LEHRBUCH DES SCHULDRECHTS 134-136 (2d ed. 1957);
TGERT, DjE GELTENDMACHUNG DES DRITMSCHADENS 50-53 (1938); German Supreme
Court, November 23, 1954, 15 B.G.H.Z. 224, 227-228; District Court (Landgericht)
Luneburg, February 24, 1955 ['955] Monatsschrift fur Deutsches Recht 355. A case
directly in point has apparently not been reported.
21G.C.C. § 281-"If, in consequence of the circumstance which makes the per-
formance impossible, the debtor acquires a substitute or a claim for compensation for
the object owed, the creditor may demand delivery of the substitute received or
assignment of the claim for compensation.
"If the creditor has a claim for compensation on account of non-performance, the
compensation to be made to him is diminished, if he exercises the right specified in
par. x, by value of the substitute received or of the claim for compensation."
22 G.C.C. § z4 9 -"A person who is bound to make compensation shall bring
about the condition which would exist if the circumstance making him liable to
compensate had not occurred. If compensation is required to be made for injury to
a person or damage to a thing, the creditor may demand, instead of restitution in kind,
the sum of money necessary to effect such restitution."
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LIABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES
CONSUMER V. RETAILER
Under the facts supposed the consumer would probably fail were
he to rely solely on negligence theories, which presuppose a duty to the
person ultimately injured.1 A retailer's duty is to act as a conduit of
goods, and a claim that he was negligent ordinarily would be grounded
on one of the following acts or omissions:' misrepresentation as to the
quality of the goods; knowledge that they are dangerous, combined
with a failure to disclose this information to the buyer; a failure to make
a reasonable examination which would have disclosed obvious defects; 3
a failure to exert reasonable care in preparing the goods for sale; or a
sale of the goods to one not competent to handle them. If the retailer
can be proved negligent in one or more of these respects, of course the
consumer can likely recover on that basis. There is, though, no indica-
tion in the hypothetical case that the retailer in any way failed to
exercise the care of a reasonably prudent seller.
'PROSSER, ToRnTS 66 (2d ed. 1955).
2 z HARPER & JAMES, Tomvs 1597-599 (1956) S PROSSER, TORTS 491-93 (2d ed.
1955).
HARPER & JAMES, TORTS ch. 28, Liability of Suppliers of Chattels, 1534-6o6 (1956),
was originally published as James, Products Liability, 34 TEXAs L. REV. 44-77, 192-228
(IgS). To obviate the necessity of repeated parallel citations throughout this article,
the writer has taken the liberty of referring only to the treatise of Professors Harper
and James.
' Professor Eldredge has forcefully attacked the position that' retailers have any
duty to inspect, arguing that this places an unreasonable affirmative duty on dealers
equal to the burden of inspection placed on manufacturers. See Eldredge, Vendor's
Tort Liability, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 306 (x941)j Eldredge, Vendor's "Duty" To
Inspect Chattels-4 Reply, 45 DICK. L. REV. 269 (i94i), both of which are reprinted
in ELDREDGE, MODERN TORT PROBLEMS 243 (1941). Most legal writers, however,
have recognized that while the retailer is not required to make tests, open sealed con-
tainers, or take the goods apart, he must at least exercise the care of a reasonable dealer
under the circumstances, i.e., inspecting where it is reasonably practical to do so or where
he has reason to believe the goods are defective. See 2 HAR.PER & JAMES, TORTS 1597
(1956); PROSSER, TORTS 492 (2d ed. 1955); Farage, Must A Vendor Inspect Chattels
Before Their SaleF'Z-A Answer, 45 DicK. L. REv. 159 (x9)4.); Farage, Vendor's
Duty To Inspect Chattels-A Rejoinder, 45 Dicx. L. REv. 282 (1941), both written
directly in answer to the Eldredge articles supra; Leidy, Tort Liability of Suppliers of
Defective Chattels, 40 MIcH. L. REV. 679 (1942). At any rate, the retailer in our
hypothetical case would be under no affirmative duty to test each ladder for latent
defects with a man weighing, say, 200 pounds or thereabout.
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As regards the liability of retailers to consumers, however, negligence
or fault of any kind is today but half the story. The consumer will,
in addition, plead breach of implied warranty, 4 normally deemed a
contract remedy' requiring no proof of negligence for recovery.' Fifty
years ago the purchaser would also have had little chance of success
under this theory since the courts were inclined to apply the harsh
doctrine of caveat emptor to transactions involving mere dealers, at
least where the goods were present and available for inspection and
the defect was not known to the seller.7 That this is not the law today
reflects one of the more interesting developments in American juris-
prudence8 and is attributable to the courts' perceiving in the Uniform
Sales Act? a verbal formula for a well-defined trend toward the opposite
extreme of absolute liability on retail sellers.
Section 15(l)"O of the Uniform Sales Act provides for an implied
'As against retailers, breach of warranty actions have largely replaced those based
on negligence. Nevertheless, the two theories have been allowed to exist simultaneously
in plaintiff's complaint, and the action for negligence may become vitally important
if for some reason the requirements of a warranty cannot be found. PROSSER, TowTs
491 (2d ed. 1955) ; cf. Ringstad v. I. Magnin & Co., 39 Wash.zd 923, 239 P.2d 848
(1952) ; Gilbert v. Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co., 237 Ala. 249, x86 So. 179 (1939),
wherein a complaint containing counts of negligence and warranty is set out.
'In its origin a warranty liability was grounded in tort, and the action was on the
case. However, at least by 1778 the English Courts were allowing plaintiffs to pro-
ceed on the contract theory of assumpsit. This notion that breach of warranty is a
contract action has apparently stuck; but noted authorities point out that in as much
as the warranty is imposed on the seller under certain conditions, whether he affirmatively
agrees to it or not, the liability cannot be based on a contract but remains a tort liability.
i WILLISTON, SALES §§ 195-197 (rev. ed. 1948); PRossER, TORTS 493-494 (2d ed.
1955); Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REv. 119, 126-127 (1958).
'I WILLISTON, SALES § 237 (rev. ed. 94.8) ; PROSSER, TORTS 494 (2d ed. 1955).
?Barnard v. Kellogg, 77 U.S. 383, 388 (1870); White v. Oakes, 88 Me. 367, 34
At. 175 (1896).
a See generally x WILLISTON, SALES ch. IX (rev. ed. 1948).
'During the period 1907-1942, the UNIFORM SALES ACT was adopted in 33 states
plus the jurisdictions of Alaska, District of Columbia, Hawaii and the Panama Canal
Zone. Of these, Massachusetts (in 1957, effective October 1, 1958) and Kentucky
(in 1958, to be effective July i, 196o) have adopted the more modern UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, first enacted by Pennsylvania in 1953. I UNIFORM LAWS ANN.
(Supp. -957, at 6-7); Ky. Acts 1958, Ch. 77. Fourteen states (Florida, Georgia,
Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia) have maintained the
common law in this field.
1" cWhere the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the
particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer
relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or
not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such
purpose." I UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 7.
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warranty of fitness for a particular purpose when such purpose is made
known to the seller and the buyer apparently relies on the seller's judg-
ment or skill to supply the item. Since the courts have construed the
section so as not to require any special purpose," apart from that to
which the article is usually put, it has been held that the nature of the
article itself may suflciently indicate the use to which it is to be applied.' 2
The major difficulty in establishing liability under section 15(0)
has been the requirement of the buyer's reliance on the judgment and
skill of the retail seller. In this context, several problematical factors
exist in the hypothetical case, for Consumer A selected the ladder him-
self and the defect was latent.'3 A split of authority in application
of the reliance factor is illustrated in somewhat analogous cases in-
volving pre-packaged food. It has been held that where the consumer
selects food in a sealed container there can be no reliance on the dealer,
for the dealer is in no better position than the purchaser to know of
any latent defect in the article. To impose liability here places an
unjust burden on the retailer, it is said, since the consumer, being aware
of the dealer's inability to inspect the food, is actually relying, if at all,
" Martin v. J. C. Penney Co., 313 P.2d 689 (Wash. 1957) ; Stonebrink v. Highland
Motors Inc., i7x Ore. 415, 137 P.ad 986 (1943), Deere & Webber Co. v. Moch, 71
N.D. 649, 3 N.W.2d 471 (1942); Weiner v. A. D. Schulte, Inc., 275 Mass. 379, 176
N.E. 114 (193i); Brandenberg v. Samuel Stores, 2i Iowa 1321, 235 N.W. 74i
(1931); Minneapolis Steel & Machinery Co. v. Casey Land Agency, 51 N.D. 832, 201
N.W. 172 (1924); Flynn v. Bedell Co. of Massachusetts, 242 Mass. 450, 136 N.E.
252 (i922). And see Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27
MINN. L. REV. 117, 133-34 (1943).
" Cases cited supra note I and Ringstad v. I. Magnin & Co., 39 Wash.2d 923,
239 P.2d 848 (x952) 5 Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, i81 Md. 614, 31 A.2d 36 (943);
Rinaldi v. Mohican Co., 225 N.Y. 70, 1z2 N.E. 471 (1918). And see Note, 34 ORE.
L. REV. 59, 61-6z (s954)-
It should be noted that the buyer cannot recover for personal injuries unless he was
harmed through a reasonable and normal use of the goods. Ringstad v. I. Magnin &
Co., supra; Landers v. Safeway Stores Inc., 172 Ore. x16, 139 P.2d 788 (1943).
'UNIFORM SALES Aar § 15(3) provides: "If the buyer has examined the goods,
there is no implied warranty as regards defects which such examination ought to have
revealed." I UNIFORIvi LAWS ANN. 7. This leaves the door open for cases where the
buyer examines, but the defect is latent. Section I5(S) is also said to prevent the
warranty if the buyer has an opportunity to inspect, but does not utilize it. I
WILLISTON, SALES § 234 (rev. ed. 1948). But that statement conceals the inarticulate
assumption that the buyer ought to have inspected, an assumption not always appropriate.
At least one case has held that it may make a difference who is buying what; that
where the buyer knows so little about the subject matter of the sale that he cannot
determine whether there are any latent defects, the implied warranty exists even though
he makes an examination. Hydrotex Industries v. Floyd, 2o9 Ark. 781, 192 S.W.zd 759
(1946) (involving liquid roofing materials).
on the producer. 4 Recent decisions, on the other hand, have tended.
to hold the retailer liable by finding "reliance" in the buyer's de-
pendence on the retailer's selection of merchandise.', The latter view
is ostensibly accepted today, even in cases not involving food,16 al-
though it rests on an unsound fiction. Its recognition, doubtless stems
from a sound judicial preference for the social desirability of the strict
liability which it produces. 17 A frank discussion on the merits of strict
liability would probably do much to dispel the unrealistic mist which
surrounds the fiction of "reliance" in many cases involving retail sales.
An additional opportunity to establish strict liability may be found
in section 15(2)"8 of the Uniform Sales Act, which provides for an
implied warranty of merchantability "where the goods are bought by
description from a seller who deals in goods of that description."
Although employed in the cases less frequently than the war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose, the warranty of merchantability
appears the more encompassing of the two.' The problem phrases here
"'Torpey v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 1z9 F. Supp. 404 (D.C. Minn. 1955), aff'd,
228 F.2d x17 (8th Cir. 1955) ; Wilkes v. Memphis Grocery Co., 23 Tenn. App. 55o,
134 S.W.zd 929 (1939), rehearing denied 24 Tenn. App. 36, 139 S.W.2d 4z6 (xg39);
McMurray v. Vaughn's Seed Store, 117 Ohio St. 236, 157 N.E, 567 (927) ; Bell v.
Bowers Stores, Inc., 3 Tenn. App. 590 (1926) 5 Crosby, J., dissenting in Ward v.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 12o N.E. 225 (1918); Bigelow v.
Maine Central R.R. Co., i o Me. xo5, 85 Ati. 396 (1912) ; Waite, Retail Responsibility
and Judicial Law Making, 34 MICH. L. REV. 494 (936).
"5Higbee v. Giant Food Shopping Center, Inc., xo6 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Va.
1952); Martin v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 3oi Ky. 429, 192 S.W.2d 2ox
(1946) ; Bonenburger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 28 A.2d 913 (942) ;
Kurriss v. Conrad & Co., 312 Mass. 670, 46 N.E.2d 12 (1942) ; Swengel v. F. & E.
Wholesale Grocery Co., 147 Kan. 555, 77 P.zd 930 (1938) ; Giminez v. Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co., 264 N.Y. 390, 191 N.E. 27 (1934) ; Burkhardt v. Armour & Co.,
115 Conn. 249, 161 At1. 385 (932); Griffin v. James Butler Grocery Co., ioS
N.J.L. 92, 156 AtI. 636 (193); Ward v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 231
Mass. 9o, 12o N.E. 225 (191S). And see 2 HARPER & JAMES, ToRTs x6oo (1956);
VOLD, SALES 454, 465-66 (1931) i Note, 34 ORE. L. REV. 59, 62, 63 (1954).
"o Higbee v. Giant Food Shopping Center, Inc., supra note 15 (home permanent);
Tremeroli v. Austin Trailer Equipment Co., so2 Cal. App. 2d 464, 227 P.2d 923
(195i) (tractor wheel); Libke v. Craig, 35 Wash.2d 870, 2x6 P.2d 189 (.950)
(hay) ; Kurriss v. Conrad & Co., supra note iS (dress).
'7 See cases and authorities cited note 15 supra and note 38 infra.
1 5
"Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods
of that description (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an
implied warranty that the goods shall be of merchantable quality." I UNFORM LAWS
ANN. 7.
19 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1582 (1956)5 Prosser, The Implied Warranty of
Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv. 117, 135 (1943). Professor Prosser also
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are "by description" and "merchantable quality." Originally sales "by
description" were limited to those involving distant goods or other
goods which required description for identification. 2' Today, however,
even where the goods are present, the buyer's mere designation of
them by their generic name is probably enough to constitute a "descrip-
tion." (Example: "A loaf of bread, please.") 21  Furthermore, where
the buyer picks out a specific chattel for himself it has been argued that
by placing the item on sale the dealer has impliedly warranted that the
article is what it appears to be and is reasonably fit for ordinary
purposes. 22 To say that this is a "sale by description" is to employ yet
another fiction, however socially desirable be the strict liability result.23
For goods to fall below the standard of "merchantable quality,"
they apparently need not be completely valueless, but merely below
"fair average quality," unfit for their normal uses, or unsalable with
their defects known. 4 At any rate, a court should have little difficulty
finding that a ladder which does not support the normal man is not
merchantable, 25 thus enabling recovery under section 15(2), wholly
aside from section i5(i).
notes that the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability may coexist in the
same transaction, thus making the inquiry as to which section applies of little practical
importance in many cases. I. at 134.
'*Williams v. S.H. Kress & Co., 48 Wash.zd 88, 291 P.2d 662 (955); American
Soda Fountain Co. v. Medford Grocery Co., 128 Ore. 83, 262 Pac. 939 (19±8)5 1
WILLISTON, SALES § 2.'2 (rev. ed. 1948) 5 Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchant-
able Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV. 117, 139-40 (1943). It is possible that the draftsmen
of the ENGLISH SALE OF GOODS ACT (1893), who first used the term "by description,"
were thinking of and codifying the rule of Jones v. Just, [1868] 3 Q.B. 197, the land-
mark case which involved Manila hemp on the high seas and which established re-
tailers' implied warranty of merchantability.
21Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 755 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. xo5 (1931).
2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS x58z (1956).
"Kohn v. BIll, 36 Tenn. App. ±i, ±54 S.W.2d 755 (-953)5 Prosser, The
Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV. 117, 143-45 (1943),
and cases cited therein; Annot., x68 A.L.R. 389, 391, 398 (-947).
" 19By description" is an instructive example of an awkward statutory term which
might better be eliminated or ignored. English courts in recent years have virtually
ignored this same technicality in the ENGLISH SALE OF GOODS ACT § 14(2), from which
UNIFORM SALES ACT § 15(2) is copied. Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, Ltd.,
[1936] A.C. 85. The UNIFOaM COMMERCIAL CODE has omitted the words "by
description?' from its provision on the warranty of merchantability. See note 36 infra.
"Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., .s5 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931)5
VOLD, SALES 456 (1931); 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 243 (rev. ed. 1948).
" One is reminded of Judge Cardozo's classic statement, or understatement, that
"loaves baked with pins in them are not of merchantable quality." Ryan v. Progressive
Grocery Stores Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 394, 175 N.E. 105, 107 (1931).
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Nothing in the pertinent sections of the Uniform Sales Act compels
the results which the American courts have been reaching.20 Indeed,
if the Act, as is often stated, merely codifies the common law, 27 the con-
sumer's claim would, at first glance, appear futile2 --that is, if one
overlooks the basic fact that it is the common law itself which is moving
away from caveat emptor.2 Rather the language of the Act has given
judges an opportunity, by indulging in some fictions, to impose on re-
tailers a warranty liability for latent defects even where there has been
no real reliance.30 It follows, then, that this liability does not neces-
sarily arise by implication from the transaction, but is imposed by law
and is in fact a tort liability without fault."1 Thus, Retailer B may be
liable for the personal injuries of Consumer A even though B exercised
due care and the defect was created by the fault of another.
Even in those jurisdictions32 which have not adopted the Uniform
"See supra notes io and is. By the language of UNIFORM SALES Acr §§ xS(z)
and 15(2), dealers are included, but there is nothing which requires the courts to
find reliance by the buyer where goods are present, or in the latent defect situation
where neither the buyer nor the retailer is aware, or can be aware, of any imperfection.
Neither is there any language which demands that courts construe fitness for a " particular
purpose" to mean an ordinary purpose, nor "by description" to apply to sales of present
specific chattels where the buyer make his own selection.
"'Adams v. Peter Tramontin Motor Sales, Inc., 42 NJ. Super, 313, 126 A.2d
358 (1956); Simon v. Graham Bakery, 17 N.J. 525, 111 A.2d 884 (1955); Childs
Dining Hall Co. v. Swingler, 173 Md. 49o , 197 Atl. lo5 (1938); McNabb v. Central
Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 272 Ky. 112, 113 S.W.2d 470 (1938); Hoback v. Coca
Cola Bottling Works of Nashville, 2o Tenn. App. 280, 98 S.W.2d 113 (1936).
" See note 7 supra. Then there is the argument that the UNIFORM SALEs AcT is
copied from the ENGLISH SALE or Goons Aar which codified the common law as set
forth in Jones v. Bright, s Bing. 533, 13o Eng. Rep. 1167 (C.P. x829), which
established fitness for purpose, but involved a manufacturer-seller rather than a mere
dealer, and Jones v. Just, L.R. 3 Q.B. 197 (868), establishing the merchantability
warranty as to dealers, but involving distant goods. At least one state has held that
the UNIFORM SALEs AcT changed the common law. Compare Scruggins v. Jones, 207
Ky. 636, 269 S.W. 743 (1925) (decided under common law principles and holding
retailer not liable in sealed container case) with Martin v. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co., 3o Ky. 429, 192 S.W.2d 201 (1946) (decided after UNIF'oRM SALEs ACiT
enactment and reaching a directly opposite result).
:' See note 33 infra.
'8 Waite, supra note 14, at 506-508 takes this approach although he reaches the
conclusion that retailers should not be strictly liable.
"'Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 139 N.E.2d 87x (Ohio App. 1957);
Buchanan v. Dugan, 82 A.2d 911 (D.C. Mun. App. i95i); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.
v. Frank, 57 N.D. 295, 221 N.W. 75 (1928); 2 HARPER & JA ES, ToRs 1571
(1956); PROSSER, ToRTS 493 (2d ed. x955); Brown, The Liability of Retail Dealers
for Defective Food Products, 23 MINN. L. REV. 585 "(x939).
" See note 9 supra.
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Sales Act the courts have gradually relaxed the regidity of common
law principles to permit broader retailer liability.8 Furthermore, the
Uniform Commercial Code,3 4 enacted so far in only three states,3 5 goes
beyond the Uniform Sales Act in expanding the situations in which an
implied warranty by the dealer may be found.'
At first blush, absolute liability may appear unduly burdensome on
dealers, but, if properly limited, it can be adequately justified under the
American economic and judicial systems. It may be noted, first, that
strict liability apparently has not hindered or impaired over-the-counter
sales. Furthermore, the difficulty of proving negligence against a
dealer, even where it exists, not to mention the dealer's lack of negli-
gence in the usual case, would leave the consumer virtually remediless
had he to rely on negligence alone; for the manufacturer, even though
at fault, is often either legally or practically unreachable. On the other
hand, the dealer is normally in privity with the consumer and can
usually be served with judicial process.3 7
" For instance, compare Dickson, Mallory & Co. v. Jordan, 33 N.C. (ix Ired. 166)
xz8, 53 Am. Dec. 403 (i85o) (where buyer relied but no recovery because seller did
not know of defect) and Woodridge v. Brown, x49 N.C. ±19, 6z S.B. 1076 (1908)
(again reliance, but no recovery because seller did not intend a warranty) with Rabb v.
Covington, ±15 N.C. 572, z S.E.±d 705 (1939) (buyer recovered consequential damages
from dealer for teeth broken on metal in sausage since there is an implied warranty
that food is merchantable and fit for consumption). See also Ashford v. H.C. Shrader
Co., 167 N.C. 45, 83 S.E. 29 (1914); Lexington Grocery Co. v. Vernoy, 167 N.C.
427, 83 S.E. 567 (1914); Williams v. Elson, zi8 N.C. 157, io S.E.2d 668 (1940).
But see Driver v. Snow, 245 N.C. 223, 95 S.E.±d 519 (1956).
Another example of a common law state which has almost caught up with those
which have adopted the UNIFORM SALES ACT is Virginia. See Higbee v. Giant Food
Shopping Center, Inc., xo6 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Va. 195z) ; Note, The Implied Warranty
of Fitness in Virginia, 43 VA. L. REV. 273 (1957)-
" Prepared by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, approved in 195± and revised in 1957.
as See note 8 supra. It should be noted that due to the 1957 revision of the
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Massachusetts and Kentucky provisions differ in some
minor respects from the Pennsylvania statute, which was taken from the 195z draft.
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(i) eliminates the words "by description"
and implies the warranty of merchantability so long as the seller is a "merchant" of
the kind of goods involved. Sec. 2-314(7) attempts to set forth minimum standards for
determining merchantability. Sec. 2-3x5 allows easier imputation of the purpose to
the seller in the warranty of fitness. Sec. 2-318 sets forth a provision unknown to the
UNIFORM SALES ACT in extending the warranty to the purchaser's family, members
of his household or his guests who may reasonably be expected to "use, consume or be
affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty." UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1957 ed.). This breaks down the doctrine of privity, a
doomed but kicking doctrine, which is discussed in the text at notes 42-48, 67-77 infra.
47 7 HARPER & JAMES, ToRTs 16oo (1956) ; Brown, supra note 31 at 596-6o.
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Basically the problem seems to be one of risk administration, about
which the law has had to make a policy choice, especially where the
retailer and consumer are equally faultless. The burden has been placed
on him who can, if not "bear" it, at least "administer" the risk. Absolute
liability may be denominated as merely part of the cost of doing
business, a cost which in all probability eventually is passed back to the
public through higher prices.38 The dealer may, and often does, insure
himself against such loss.39 Moreover, when sued, the retailer may
vouch in or implead the manufacturer" or subsequently recover in-
demnity from him either in a separate suit or by the more common means
of negotiation.41  In essence, it may be said that strict liability on re-
tailers comports harmoniously with contemporary ideas of fairness and
with what the buyer may reasonably expect from a modern and highly
integrated commercial world.
CONSUMER V. MANUFACTUR.ER
At the turn of the century a personally injured consumer could not
have recovered from a manufacturer even on the basis of the latter's
negligence, for there was no contract and, thus, not the required privity
between the parties.42 Gradually, however, the cases carved out ex-
ceptions to this devastating rule which had virtually insulated the
manufacturer from liability.43
8 Higbee v. Giant Food Shopping Center, Inc., io6 F. Supp. 586 (E.D.Va. 1952);
Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey, x39 Tex. 623, x64 S.W.2d 835 (1942) 5 Rabb v. Coving-
ton, 215 N.C. 572, 7 S.E.2d 705 (1939) ; Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255
N.Y. 388, 392, 175 N.E. zo5, io6 (1931); Ward v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,
231 Mass. 90, 12o N.E. 225 (1g8); 2 HARPER & JAMES, ToRTs 16oo (1956); VOLD,
SALES 465-66 (-93-).
39 2 HARPEI & JAMES, ToRTs 16ox (.956).
'
0 Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 755 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. xo5 (193 0 ;
Davis v. Radford, 233 N.C. 283, 63 S.E.2d 827 (.951).
,1 2 HARPER & JAMES, ToRTs 16oi (1956); Brown, supra note 3 at 6o6.
Allowing the retailer to recover from the manufacturer creates a paradox: If the
retailer is strictly liable to the consumer in non-food cases under a warranty, and may,
in turn, recover from the manufacturer on the same warranty, then it would seem that
a liability without fault is indirectly, a least, being placed on the manufacturer for
articles for which he would not be liable to the consumer even for fault under the Mac-
Pherson doctrine, discussed in the text beginning at note 44 infra.
" Winterbottom v. Wright, io M. & W. 1o9, i L.J.Ex. 415 (1842).
"Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., ixo Fed. 865 (8th Cir. 1903),
summarized these exceptions. (a) Even lacking privity, the maker was held liable if
he knowingly provided an "imminently dangerous" article "without notice of its
qualities" and a third party was injured in a manner reasonably foreseeable. (b) If
an owner's invitee suffered injuries through the use of the owner's defective article,
then the owner was liable. (c) Most important, a manufacturer was held responsible
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In 1916 the landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.44
cut away the "exceptions," greatly extending manufacturer liability for
negligence by announcing that "... . if the nature of a thing is such that
it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently
made, it is then a thing of danger." 5  [Emphasis added.] This rule
was to be applied for the benefit of third parties where it was reasonably
to be expected by the manufacturer that others than his immediate
purchaser, i.e. the retailer, would use the product.46  Although the
MacPherson case limited liability to the ultimate purchaser, subsequent
decisions have extended the responsibility to those who may reasonably
be expected to be endangered by a defective product. 47 The Mac-
Pherson rule has been accepted almost universally,4 and privity as a
requirement for manufacturer liability on the basis of negligence has
been effectively entombed.
There is still no dear identification of the types of products which
fall within the MacPherson doctrine. Apparently the chattel involved
must be of a kind that could reasonably be foreseen to cause more than
trivial harm if defective. Yet in recent years the rule increasingly has
been extended to items not usually considered "inherently dangerous.
49
The MacPherson case itself involved an automobile wheel, and liability
has since been applied in connection with such articles as electric ap-
pliances.6 cigarettes,5 and even hair combs.52 More significantly for
to injured third parties for the negligent preparation of products "intended to pre-
serve, destroy or affect human life." Id. at 87o-871. For several years this somewhat
vague classification was applied only to such items as food, beverages, poisons and
explosives as the courts confined their view to the inherent nature of the product itself
in evaluating its dangerous potentalities. PROSSER, ToPTS 499 (2d ed. 1955);
Noel, Manufacturers of Products-The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 TENN. L. REV.
963 (-957)-
" 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (.9x6).
"Id. at 389, x1x N.E. at 1053.
& Ibid.
"
7PRosSER, TORTS 501 (2d ed. 1955); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 395, comment b
(1934).
'8 PROSSER, TORTS 500 (2d ed. 1955) 5 Noel, supra note 43, at 965.
2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1552-54 (1956); PROSSER, ToRTS 500-501 (2d ed.
1955) ; Noel, supra note 43, at 967-68.
50 Rosebrock v. General Electric Co., 236 N.Y. 227, 14o N.E. 571 (923).
' De Lape v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 25 F.Supp. oo6 (D.C. Cal. 1939),
aff'd io9 F.2d 598 (gth Cir. 1940); Meditz v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 167
Misc. 176, 3 N.Y.S.zd 357 (1938).
"' Smith v. S.S. Kresge Co., 79 F.ad 361 (8th Cir. 1935).
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our purposes, the rule also has been utilized in cases involving household
furniture and ladders.'
Liability hinges on reasonable foreseeabilityi the court must be
satisfied that a reasonably prudent manufacturer would have foreseen
the unreasonable risk of harm lurking in a defective product. 54  Makers
are not held liable if the defect or danger is obvious .to the consumer,
who is then apparently held to have assumed the risk," nor if the con-
sumer is hurt through an unnatural use of the product. 6 The same may
be true where the user fails to follow instructions,57 although there is
some authority to the effect that a manufacturer has a duty to warn as
to dangers that may result if instructions are not followed, unless such
dangers are obvious in themselves.5 On the other hand, negligence by
an intervening handler may not insulate the manufacturer from liability.
Again it is a question of foreseeability, and some juries have been per-
mitted to find that negligence, such as the retailer's failure to inspect,
is reasonably to be expected by the maker.59 Affirmative negligence by
an intermediary probably evokes a different rule.6"
A negligence action involves difficult burdens of proof for the con-
"Benedict v. Eppley Hotel Co., 159 Neb. 23, 65 N.W.zd 224 (x9.54) (folding
chair); Okker v. Chrome Furniture Mfg. Corp., 26 N.J. Super. 295, 97 A.2d 699
(1953) (bar stool) ; Simmons Co. v. Hardin, 75 Ga. App. 420, 43 S.E.zd 553 (1947)
(bed) ; Sheward v. Virtue, 20 Cal.2d 410, 126 P.zd 345 (1942) (leather chair);
Kalash v. Los Angeles Ladder Co., i Cal.2d 229, 34 P.zd 481 (1934) (ladder).
'2 HARPER & JAMES, ToRTS 929, 1554 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS 500, 502 (2d
ed. i955).
" Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 8oz (95o); Yaun v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 253 Wis. 558, 34 N.W.zd 853 (1948); Noel, supra note 43, at
973. But see z HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1543 (1956), which argues that the extent
of the danger and the feasibility of the manufacturer installing safety devices should be
factors considered by a jury in determining whether the maker was negligent even
though the danger is obvious.
:"PROSSER, TORTS 503 (zd ed. 1955).
7r Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 139 Wash. 341, 246 Pac. 945 (1926) (contrary to
instructions, tractor was run at high speed causing it to tip over backwards on operator.
Held, maker not liable).
"McClanahan v. California Spray-Chemical Corp., 194 Va. 842, 75 S.E.2d 712
(1953). And see 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1548 (1956) which notes, "An assurance
of safety, as well as a failure to warn of danger, may be negligence." It also points
out that the manufacturer may be held liable if the warnings or instructions are not
adequate under the circumstances. Id. at 1548, 1549.
"Pierce v. Ford Motor Co., 190 F.2d 91o (4 th Cir. 19si), :.rt. denied, 342 U.S.
887 (ig95) 5 Rosebrock v. General Electric Co., 236 N.Y. 227, 14o N.E. 571 (1923)1
PROSSER, TORTS 504 (2d ed. 1955); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 447 (1934).
"Rulane Gas Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., z3 N.C. 270, S6 S.E.2d 689
(949) ; Noel, supra note 42, at 974, 975.
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sumer who must establish that the injury occurred as a result of the de-
fect, that the defective condition was an unreasonably dangerous one,
that the defect is attributable to the maker's negligence, and that the
imperfection existed when it left the manufacturer's custody.61
The nature of the required proof and the consumer's remoteness
from and unfamiliarity with the manufacturer's production methods
make it obvious that recovery will largely depend upon circumstantial
evidence or the doctrine of res ipsa loquitr."2 With increasing liberality
the courts have applied this doctrine to cases involving manufacturers.8 3
Under it the consumer must establish (I) that the accident was of a
type that does not ordinarily occur unless there has been negligence, (2)
that nothing the user did caused the accident, (3) that the product was
in the maker's control when the defect arose, and, perhaps, (4) that the
evidence is more readily accessible to the producer than to the plaintiff.0 4
Since in the hypothetical case the defect is latent or inherent in the wood
of the ladder, it may logically be inferred that the accident-causing
imperfection arose during production, while the article was in the manu-
facturer's control, and without any negligence or tampering by the
consumer 8 5 Therefore, Consumer A can probably establish a case of
circumstantial evidence strong enough for submission to a jury under
a' See 2 HApER & JAmEs, TOmTs 1560-1569 (1956). The requirement of proving
the condition was unreasonably dangerous stems from the MacPherson rule. See text
at note 45, supra. Professors Harper and James point out that whether there is the
requisite danger is usually a matter of evaluation for the court or jury. Evidence
which may affect this evaluation is the experience of others or expert testimony. Id.
at 1562, 1563.
2 PROSSER, TORTS 505 (2d ed. 1955).
"2 See Noel, supra note 43, at 977-79. But see Condon, Product Liability Cases-
x956, 12 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 215, 218 (1957) which says that res ipsa loquitur
as a basis for recovery in food, drug, and cosmetic cases is decreasing in favor of
warranty actions.
" For a thorough discussion of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and its procedural
effect, see PROSSER, ToRTs 199-217 (2d ed. 1955). The determination of element
(i), in the text above, depends largely on common knowledge, but where this is
lacking as to the subject matter at hand, expert testimony may be introduced. Id. at
2o2. Professor Prosser does not approve element (4), in the text above, as a re-
quirement although he admits it may have some relevance in persuading the court to
apply the doctrine. Id. at 209. Of course, even if the plaintiff establishes all the
elements, he has still not proved the defendant negligent. Rather he has raised an
inference of negligence, which a jury may or may not accept even if defendant intro-
duces no evidence. But a small minority of states hold that by meeting the require-
ments of res ipsa loquitur the plaintiff creates a presumption of negligence, thus,
shifting the burden of introducing evidence to the defendant. Id. at a1-1 3 .
"i See Noel, supra note 43, at 977-78..
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the res ipsa loquitar doctrine in which event he will likely recover
damages for his injuries from Manufacturer C.
Before turning to the status of manufacturer liability under implied
warranties, it should be noted that there exists a form of strict liability
agaihist producers where consumers are injured through defective
products that violate the standards of certain statutes enacted for the
safety of the public at large. This is so even where the pertinent statute
offers no civil remedy, for the prevailing view is that the placing of
certain substandard items on the market in violation of the statute is
negligence per se.OG
Once the requirement of privity was discarded in negligence actions,
it was only natural that strong policy considerations should produce a
demand that the privity rule be further abandoned to provide the strict
liability features of implied warranties against the manufacturer as well
as the dealer. Food cases have led the way in rejecting privity require-
ments and partially opening the door to strict liability through implied
warranties.0 7  A recent count as to food cases showed that 18 states still
require privity, but that 12 have definitely abandoned it and i9 are at
least uncertain. 8
Liability without fault is just emerging in the area of general
products, however.69 Here many of the cases are ostensibly grounded
on the finding of something approaching an express warranty, either in
the product's label or in the manufacturer's advertising.70 But there are
:6 See 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 2590-92 (.956) ; Noel, supra note 43, at 979, 980.
"Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.zd 828 (1942);
Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal.zd 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939); Madouros v.
Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W.2d 445 ( 936); Ward
Baking Co. v. Trizino, 27 Ohio App. 475, z6x N.E. 557 (1928); Davis v. Van Camp
Packing Co., x89 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382 (192o); Catani v. Swift & Co., 251 Pa.
52, 95 Atl. 931 (1915).
asDICKERSON, PRODUCTs LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER 94 n. 2 (195!).
This count includes the District of Columbia, which is one of the 18 jurisdictions re-
quiring privity.
as The term "general products" is a frame of reference meant to encompass mechanical
items, tools, furniture, and the like, and would certainly cover the stepladder in our
hypothetical case. It is used to distinguish the above class of items from food and
articles analogous to food in their intimate relationship to the body, such as soap,
cosmetics, drugs, tobacco, etc.
"0Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 147 N.E.2d 612 (Ohio 1958) (permanent
wave) ; Simpson v. American Oil Co., 717 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940) (insecticide);
Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 29o Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939) ("'seamless"
automohile top); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., x68 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932)
("shatterproof" windshield) ; and see i WILLISTON, SALES § 244(a) (rev. ed. 1948),
approving a warranty liability arising from the expressions in labels and advertising.
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a number of decisions which, citing the food cases as authority, have
frankly abandoned the privity requirement as to non-food products
where only an implied warranty can be found.71  Admittedly, most of
these cases have concerned articles such as soap, cosmetics and tobacco,
which are somewhat analogous to food in their intimacy to the body.
Yet there is some authority, though scant, to the effect that strict liability
should be applied to mechanical and other general products as well. 2
In breaking down the privity requirement, various courts have em-
ployed or suggested the following rationales, among others: (i) Public
policy now demands that privity not bar manufacturer liability through
implied warranties;1 3 (2) The warranty from the maker to his buyer,
the retailer, runs with the product to the consumer and others who
foreseeably may be injured by a defective artide 74 (3) The consumer
is a third party beneficiary of the contract between the manufacturer and
the dealer;1 5 (4) Under certain circumstances the dealer is really an
agent either for the manufacturer or the consumer and, thus, there is
privity between the parties. 6 Most likely, the cogent factor in all these
"' McAfee v. Cargill, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Cal. 1954) (dog food) ; Raymond
v. J. R. Watkins Co., 88 F. Supp. 932 (D.C. Minn. x95o) (dictum) (shampoo); Nichols
v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (x953) (exploding bottle); Krupar v. Procter
& Gamble Co., 113 N.E.zd 605 (Ohio App. 1953), reed. on other grounds, 16o Ohio
St. 489, 117 N.E.2d 7 (1954) (bar of soap) ; Graham v. Bottenfield's Inc., 176 Kan.
68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954) (dictum) (hair dye); Webb v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Co., 121 W.Va. 115, 2 S.E.ad 898, 9o2 (1939) (concurring opinion, dictum) (dead
worm or moth in chewing tobacco); Dow Drug Co. v. Nieman, 57 Ohio App. x9o
,
13 N.E.2d 130 (1936) (exploding cigar).
" DiVello v. Gardner Machine Co., 102 N.E.2d 289 (Ohio C.P. 1951) (grinding
wheel) ; but see Wood v. General Electric Co., 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E.zd 8
(1953). Professor Noel notes that even the DiVello case may be based on the idea of
extending the warranty after sale to employees much as UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-318 does to members of purchaser's household. He also states that the Wood case,
supra, seems to overrule DiVello, without mentioning it by name, as to relaxation of
privity. See Noel, supra note 43, at 995 996.
"Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942)
Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal.ad 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939); Madouros v.
Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W.2d 445, 450 (1936)
("If privity of contract is required, then, under the situation and circumstance of modern
merchandise in such matters, privity of contract exists in the consciousness and under-
standing of all right-thinking persons.").
" Davis v. Radford, 233 N.C. 283, 63 S.E.2d 822 (951) 5 Simpson v. American
Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.zd 813 (1940); Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons,
145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927).
"'Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928).
"'Timberland Lumber Co. v. Climax Mfg. Co., 61 F.2d 391 (3 d Cir. 1932); Wis-
dom v. Morris Hardware Co., 151 Wash. 86, 274 Pac. o5o (.929).
For an exhaustive compilation of cases in which courts have mentioned various legal
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cases is public policy, and the courts are utilizing various legal fictions
in order to avoid irrevocably adopting a strict liability system in an area
where its practical effects are still virtually untested.77
As in the case of retailers, there are good reasons for urging that
strict liability be applied to manufacturers. It is argued that such a
responsibility will tend to promote safer products; that the complexity
of modern technology renders the proof of negligence unreasonably
difficult, if not impossible, especially with regard to remote (out-of-state)
producers; and that manufacturers are better able to administer the
risk of such liability by controlling prices. 8 Furthermore, if the re-
tailer is strictly liable and may subsequently recover from the manu-
facturer, the imposition of an identical liability on makers will avoid
circuity and multiplicity of suits and place no greater financial burden
on manufacturers.79 To be sure, certain of the arguments are untested
in a practical sense, and there are those who disagree with one or more
of them, or at least with certain applications of some of them. 0 Hence,
there may be valid justifications for the courts to proceed cautiously in
this field until the effects of strict liability can be adequately judged.
Nevertheless, at least one writer has pointed out that abandoning
privity as to implied warranties would cause no greater practical change
than did the MacPherson rule."' Moreover, if it is true that implied
warranties are imposed by law rather than contract-that as applied to
personal injuries they offer really a tort theory of recovery 52-- then, per-
haps, on pure legal theory alone the change would not be great, but mere-
ly in line with the modern trend to extend the idea of strict liability in
formulae to get around the privity problem, see Gillam, Products Liability in a
Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REV. iI9, 153-55 (1958).
"See Noel, supra note 43, at 988; Amram and Goodman, Some Problems in the
La-w of Implied Warranty, 3 SYRACUSE L. REV. 259, 268 (195.) ; Gillam, supra note
76, at i5s.
"aSee generally 2 HARPER & JAMES, ToRTs 1510-14, 16o5 ( 956); Noel, supra
note 43, at oog-1o; Traynor, J., concurring in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of
Fresno, 24 Cal.zd 453, 150 P.zd 436 (1944); James, General Products-Shouhl
Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negligence, 24 TENN. L. REV. 923 (1957).
" Noel, supra note 43, at ioio. And would not this help eliminate the paradox
mentioned at note -41 supra?
so See Green, Should the Manufacturer of General Products Be Liable Without
Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. REV. 928, 930-34 (957), which seemingly would not
place strict liability on manufacturers in cases involving mechanical products; Plant,
Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products-An Op-
posing View, 24 TENN. L. REv. 938 (x957).
"Noel, supra note 43, at 1o5.
82 See note 31 supra.
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certain areas of tort law.8" Finally, even under an implied warranty
theory the manufacturer does not become a social insurer, for it is a
liability limited by high degrees of proof as to defectiveness, causation
and the injuries that are reasonably foreseeable from a normal use of
a defective product.84
It cannot yet be said that liability without fault is the general rule
as to .producers, especially in a non-food case such as our hypothetical
case. There are traces of a start in that direction, but as of today Con-
sumer A might well be advised that there is a strong likelihood that he
will fail in any attempt to recover from Manufacturer C on the basis of
breach of warranty.
*' See James, supra note 78, at 924, 925; Noel, supra note 43, at 1014-15.
2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1604-1605 (1956); Noel, supra note 43, at ioi6-
17.
